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I.

INTRODUCTION

When a student of the law embarks upon an investigation of
products liability law in New Jersey, inevitably, attention is focused on the "Wade-Keeton approach."' This approach represents an attempt by two preeminent legal scholars to articulate
the conceptual difference between product liability actions2
grounded in negligence and those premised upon strict liability.
In negligence actions, the examination is focused on the conduct
of the manufacturer that placed a product on the market, and
whether the decision to do so was reasonable, given all the attendant circumstances.3 In strict liability actions, "the issue is
whether the product is defective, regardless of how or why it became defective." 4
This article suggests that, while the legal fiction of presumed
knowledge was useful in the embryonic stages of product liability
* This article in no way reflects the position of the New Jersey courts.

B.A., Rutgers University 1962; L.L.B., Rutgers School of Law, Newark 1965.
Adjunct Professor, Seton Hall Law School; Judge, New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division.
*** B.A., University of Notre Dame 1983; J.D., Syracuse Univeristy School of Law
1986.
1 John W. Wade is Dean Emeritus and Distinguished Professor Emeritus at
Vanderbilt School of Law. W. Page Keeton is Dean Emeritus and Professor Emeritus at the University of Texas School of Law.
2 See Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 568 (1969); Wade, On the Effect in
Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734,
761-64 (1983) [hereinafter Wade, Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing]; Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834-37 (1973)
[hereinafter Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort]; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 15 (1965) [hereinafter Wade, Strict Tort Liability].
3 L. BASS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2.05 (1986). "Under the theory of negligence,
the standard of responsibility is the duty to exercise due care in supplying products
that do not present an unreasonable risk of injury or harm to the public." Id.
4 Id. at § 2.06. "In distinguishing negligence from strict liability, negligence
looks to the conduct of the manufacturer while strict liability focuses on the character of the product." Id. See also Keeton, supra note 2, at 563 (discussing the practical differences between a negligence and a strict liability action).
**
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law,5 the case law development in New Jersey indicates that this
notion should either be reformulated or stricken from the language of strict liability law. 6 In order to establish that conclusion, this article will trace the development of strict liability with
primary emphasis upon New Jersey case law, as well as an examination of essential cases from other jurisdictions. The analytical
emphasis will rest upon the judicial interpretation of the WadeKeeton construct and whether that construct has outlived its
usefulness.

II.

THE GENESIS OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Years before the New Jersey Supreme Court embarked upon

its difficult journey into the realm of strict products liability, the
seminal concepts of that doctrine were formulated in 1944 by the

California Supreme Court in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.'

In

Escola, the California Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict in

favor of a waitress who was injured by an exploding soda bottle.8
The court concluded that the facts entitled the plaintiff "to rely

on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference of
negligence." 9

In his concurring opinion, Justice Traynor articulated an innovative and radically different basis for the imposition of liability in similar fact situations. In words that would become the
cornerstone of strict liability, Justice Traynor asserted that "it
should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute
liability when an article that he has placed on the market, know5 In 1983, in a postscript to one of his numerous products liability articles,
Dean Wade suggests as much, claiming that assumed knowledge is a legal fiction,
"and, like all fictions, it can create difficulties if taken literally." Wade, Knowledge
UnavailablePriorto Marketing,supra note 2, at 764. The general rule regarding manufacturer's knowledge has been that "[i]f a manufacturer is actually aware of a hazard, or should be aware, it will be liable for the injuries which occur from a
foreseeable use of the product and its attendant hazardous qualities." L. BASS,
supra note 3, § 3.07.
6 This hypothesis has been most graphically illustrated in the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J.
191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). See infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
7 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
8 Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440. The plaintiff, a restaurantwaitress, sustained injuries while placing bottles of soda into a refrigerator. Id. at 456, 150 P.2d at 437-38.
The bottles, part of a larger soda delivery, had not been moved since they had been
placed in the restaurant by the defendant's driver some thirty-six hours earlier. Id.,
150 P.2d at 437. As the plaintiff picked up one of the bottles and began to move it
towards the refrigerator, the bottle exploded, causing serious injury to her hand.
Id., 150 P.2d at 438.
9 Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.

176

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:174

ing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings."' 0 Thus, the
manufacturer would be forced to guarantee the quality and safety
of a product even when there is no evidence of negligence.''
Nineteen years later, the California Supreme Court adopted
the doctrine of strict liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc. 12 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Traynor echoed his
concurring opinion in Escola by stating that "[a] manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
'3
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.'
The imposition of such liability was designed "to insure that the
costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by
the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather
than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves." 14

The rationale supporting these early California cases was reflected in 1965 in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
As opposed to the traditional examination of the manufacturer's
conduct in a tort case sounding in negligence, section 402A dictates that liability will be imposed upon the seller of a defective
product that causes injury despite the seller's reasonable conduct.' 5 Section 402A places the responsibility to bear the costs
of accidental injuries caused by defective products on the manu10 Id. (Traynor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Citing public policy justifications, Justice Traynor stated that "[e]ven if there is no negligence... responsibility
[must] be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market." Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at
440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
II See id. at 465, 150 P.2d at 442.
12 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
13 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. In Greenman, the court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of a consumer who sustained serious injuries as a
result of the defective design and construction of a tool manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 59-60, 377 P.2d at 898-99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99.
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff
proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way it was
intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of
which plaintiff was not aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its
intended use.
Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
14 Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The comment to section
402A clearly states that application of strict liability "is not exclusive, and does not
preclude liability based upon the alternative ground of negligence of the seller,
where such negligence can be proved." d. at comment a.
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facturers who place those products into the stream of commerce. 16 Furthermore, inquiry under this provision centers on
the product and its defectiveness, rather than on the manufac17
turer's conduct.
It was against this background that Wade and Keeton sought
to formulate the meaning of defect in strict liability.' 8 As an initial matter, it should be noted that this exploration of strict liability will be limited to the manufacturer's liability for a design
defect, as opposed to a manufacturing defect.1 9 In 1965, Wade
posed a question which is fundamental to an analysis of strict liability cases: "[A]ssuming that the defendant had knowledge of
the condition of the product, would he then have been acting
unreasonably in placing it on the market?" 20 As for Keeton, his
first pronouncement of these principles preceded both Justice
Traynor's opinion in Greenman and section 402A. 2' In the con16

Id. at comment c.

17 See Wade, On Product Design Defects and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551,

553 (1980) (discussing emphasis placed on analysis of the product in strict liability
actions).
18 Wade, Knowledge Unavailable Priorto Marketing, supra note 2, at 741-45; Wade,
Strict Tort Liability, supra note 2, at 14-21.
19 Manufacturing defect implies that the product in question will fail to meet the
manufacturer's own quality control standards. L. BASS, supra note 3, § 4.04. Two
types of manufacturing defects can render a product defective: either flaws in the
components or raw materials of a product or mistake in the assembly of component
parts. Id. In such cases, the inquiry concerns "whether the defect is due to a mistake in manufacturing, normal wear and tear, or misuse. The test is whether the
product was in the same defective condition at the time it left the defendant's control as at the time the plaintiff was injured." Id. (footnote omitted).
In design defect cases, however, all products are constructed according to the
specifications of the manufacturer, but nevertheless, the product still contains an
inherent danger.
Design defects occur when a product does not adequately protect
against risks of injury, fails to perform intended functions safely, does
not protect adequately against the danger it was supposed to guard
against (a smoke detector that causes a fire), creates unreasonably dangerous side effects (the drug DES), or fails to minimize avoidable consequences in the event of an accident.
L. BASS, supra note 3, § 4.03. See also Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 418,
573 P.2d 443, 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228 (1978) (dual standard test to determine
if product design is defective). Design defect cases can take the form of an inadequate technological design or a finding of defect due to a failure to warn or an
inadequate warning concerning the danger of the product. See Beshada v. JohnsManville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (warnings relating to dangers of asbestos considered inadequate); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87
N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981) (inadequacy of warnings regarding the danger of
nitrocellulose); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d
140 (1979) (product defective due to lack of guard apparatus).
20 Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 2, at 15.
21 See Keeton, Products Liability-CurrentDevelopments, 40 TEX. L. REV. 193 (1961).
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text of an implied warranty, he wrote:
A product is not fit for the general purpose intended, if a reasonable man with full knowledge of all the properties and the
danger therein, would continue to market the product because
the utility of its use outweighs the danger ....

The essential

difference between warranty liability and negligence liability
lies in the fact that excusable ignorance of a defect or the
properties
of a product is immaterial as regards warranty
22
liability.

Even at this early stage in the evolution of their hypotheses on
this topic, subtle differences existed between the two commentators.
For instance, Wade imputes the manufacturer with knowledge of the
danger of the product, 23 while Keeton would impute both knowledge of the danger and knowledge of the defect.2 4 It was not until
1973, in the wake of the California Supreme Court decision in
Cronin v. J B. E. Olson Corp.2 5 that the differences between Keeton and
Wade became evident.
In Cronin, the California Supreme Court reviewed a jury verdict
in favor of a plaintiff who was injured as a result of the defective
manufacture of metal hasps. 26 The plaintiff was a route salesman
for a bakery and, in. the course of his employment, drove a vehicle
with built-in bread racks secured by metal hasps. 27 When the plaintiff's van was involved in a collision with another vehicle, one of the
hasps broke, allowing loaded bread trays to strike the plaintiff and
propel him through the windshield. 2' The plaintiff alleged that the
metal hasp was defectively manufactured, rendering it too weak to
withstand the impact of the collision.2 9
The California Supreme Court compared the Greenman test to
determine a manufacturer's culpability to the "unreasonably dangerous" language of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts."0 The court expressed concern that the phrase "defective
22
23
24
25

Id. at 210.
See Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 2, at 15-16.
Wade, Knowledge UnavailablePrior to Marketing, supra note 2, at 761-64.
8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).

26
27

Id. at 124-25, 501 P.2d at 1155-56, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435-36.
Id. at 124, 510 P.2d at 1155, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435.

Id.
Id., 501 P.2d at 1156, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 436. The plaintiff alleged that the
metal hasp was "exceedingly porous, contained holes, pits and voids, and lacked
sufficient tensile strength .... " Id.
3o Id. at 131-32, 501 P.2d at 1161, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441. Although the court
noted that "the similarities between the Greenman standard and the Restatement
formulation are greater than their differences," it did acknowledge that there was
"an apparent divergence in the two formulations." Id.
28
29
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condition unreasonably dangerous" as contained in section 402
would lead to the utilization of a bifurcated standard. 3 1 Such a standard would place a substantially
onerous burden on the plaintiff in
32
strict liability litigation.
Additionally, the court indicated that the test articulated in
Greenman could be easily applied "to the full range of products liability situations, including those involving 'design defects.'"" The
California Supreme Court then dismissed the perceived distinction
between defects in design and defects which arise due to manufacturing processes as untenable.3 4 Such distinctions would only result
in the creation of a more difficult burden of proof for the injured
consumer.3 5 Thus, the California Supreme Court effectively struck
the "unreasonably dangerous" language of section 402A, instead
announcing that:
We believe the Greenman formulation is consonant with the rationale and development of products liability law in California
because it provides a clear and simple test for determining
whether the injured plaintiff is entitled to recovery. We are
not persuaded to the contrary by the formulation of section
402A which inserts the factor of an "unreasonably dangerous"
condition into the equation of products liability.3 6
This pronouncement by the California Supreme Court provoked criticism from many commentators, including Wade and Keeton.3 7 In suggesting an appropriate test of a defective product,
Keeton wrote:
A product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as marketed. It is unreasonably dangerous if a reasonable person
would conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the time of trial outweighed

the benefits of the way the product was so designed and
31 Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. A bifurcated test "would
require the finder of fact to conclude that the product is, first, defective and, second, unreasonably dangerous." Id. (citation omitted).

32
33

Id.
Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.

34

Id., 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443. The court commented that the

creation of a distinction between design and manufacturing defects would create
situations where "it would be advantageous to characterize a defect in one rather
than the other category." Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974);
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort, supra note 2; Comment, Elimination of "Unreasonably Dangerous from § 402A-The Price of Consumer Safety?, 14 DuQ L. REV. 25 (1975).
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marketed. 8
This however is significantly different from Wade's approach to the
same issue. In 1973, Wade suggested the application of the following seven factors to evaluate the culpability of a manufacturer:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its
utility to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood
that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the
injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without impairing its usefulness or
making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product,
or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance."9
Thus, a dichotomy existed between Wade and Keeton concerning
the point in time when knowledge was imputed.4" With this theoretical distinction as a backdrop, the New Jersey Supreme Court embarked upon its journey through the vicissitudes of strict products
liability law.
III.

THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE
WADE AND KEETON APPROACHES

An examination into the New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis of strict products liability and its consideration of Wade and
38 Keeton, supra note 37, at 37-38 (emphasis in original). Clearly Keeton was
imputing the defendant manufacturer with knowledge of dangers that are scientifically unknowable at the time of marketing.
39 Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort, supra note 2, at 837-38. Wade therefore
limited the presumed knowledge of the dangerous condition of the product to that
which was scientifically knowable at the time of marketing. Id. at 834.
40 One of the first acknowledgments of this dichotomy noted that "[t]he Wade

and Keeton formulations of the standard appear to be identical except that Keeton
would impute the knowledge of dangers at time of trial to the manufacturer, while
Wade would impute only the knowledge existing at the time the product was sold."
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492 n.6, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 n.6
(1974) (citations omitted).
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Keeton's ideas commences with the case of Cepeda v. Cumberland
Engineering Co. 4 In Cepeda, the plaintiff sought relief on the theory of strict liability for defendant's defective design of its product.4 2 The product in question was a machine that cut strands of
plastic into small pellets.4" The manufacturer had not made any
provision to prevent the machine from operating if the safety
guard was removed.4 4 Thus, it was the failure of the manufacturer to equip the machine with such a safety device that constituted the design defect which formed the basis for the suit.4 5
In evaluating the application of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of section 402A to design defect cases, the majority reviewed the writings of Wade and Keeton.4 6 However, the
court opined that consideration of the "unreasonably dangerous" element was only appropriate "if understood to render the
liability of the manufacturer4 7 substantially coordinate with liability
on negligence principles.
The New Jersey Supreme Court had occasion to again consider design defect issues in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine
Co. 48 The alleged design defect was the lack of a guard apparatus
which would have prevented the accidental activation of the
machine. 49 The court began its examination of controlling principles in design defect cases by stating a maxim of strict products
liability law.
If at the time the seller distributes a product, it is not reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended or reasonably foreseeable purposes so that users or others who may be expected
to come in contact with the product are injured as a result
thereof, then the seller shall be responsible for the ensuing
76 NJ. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
42 Id. at 161, 386 A.2d at 820.
43 Id. at 164, 386 A.2d at 822.
44 Id. at 164-65, 386 A.2d at 822. In addition to protecting the fingers of workers, "the guard was also designed (1) to aid production as a control over the direction in which the strands were fed to the rollers and (2) to contain stray pellets
which might bounce out of the machine." Id. at 165, 386 A.2d at 822.
45 Id. at 161, 386 A.2d at 820. The electronic interlock mechanism, which would
have prevented the machine from operating without the guard in place, was alleged
to be readily available and could have been easily installed. Id.
46 Id. at 170, 171 & n.4, 172, 386 A.2d at 825 & n.4, 826 (citing Keeton, Product
Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 39 (1973); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20
SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 562-63 (1969); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability For
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837 (1973)).
47 Id. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825.
48 81 NJ. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
49 Id. at 157, 406 A.2d at 143.
41
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damages.5 °

Next, the court emphasized the plaintiff's burden of proving
that the product defect existed when the manufacturer placed the
article into the stream of commerce. 5 ' According to the majority
opinion, it would be proper in design defect cases for the jury to
consider the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in light
of the state of the art at the time of distribution. 52 The court posited
that "the state of the art refers not only to the common practice and
standards in the industry but also to other design alternatives within
practical and technological limits at the time of distribution.

'5 3

It is

interesting to note that in devising its design defect analysis, the
New Jersey Supreme Court relied repeatedly on Wade's construct,5 4
but omitted reference to Keeton altogether.
Two years after its decision in Suter, the New Jersey Supreme
Court again addressed the issue of design defect in Freund v. Cellofilm
Properties, Inc.55 The plaintiff in that case was employed by the defendant corporation to maintain and unload drums of nitrocellulose.5 6 This chemical, used in the manufacture of lacquers and
paints, was extremely flammable. 57 The plaintiff was injured when
some of the chemical spilled from the mixing machine where he was
working and caught on fire. 58 The plaintiff then brought an action
alleging that the warning provided by the manufacturer of the nitrocellulose inadequately informed him of the fire hazard posed by the
chemical. 5 9
50

Id. at 169, 406 A.2d at 149 (footnote omitted).

51 Id. at 170, 406 A.2d at 150. The court noted that the plaintiff has no burden

to demonstrate that the defect was created by the manufacturer. Id. However, the
court further stated, "[w]hat is important is that the defect did in fact exist when the

product was distributed by and was under the control of defendant." Id.
52 Id. at 171, 406 A.2d at 150. State of the art is defined as "that level of scientific and technical knowledge that exists irrespective of whether that knowledge has
been transformed into marketable products. L. BASS, supra note 3, § 4.18.
53 Suter, 81 N.J. at 172, 406 A.2d at 151.
54 Id. at 171, 172 n.9, 174 & n.10, 406 A.2d at 150, 151 n.9, 152 & n.10 (citing
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830-31, 835-38
(1973)).

87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
Id. at 233, 432 A.2d at 927.
Id. "Nitrocellulose is extremely flammable even in liquid form, but when allowed to dry the chemical dust becomes even more dangerous." Id.
58 Id. at 234, 432 A.2d at 927.
59 Id. The warning on the drums read as follows:
Fire may result if container is punctured or severely damaged-Handle
carefully-Do not drop or slide-Hazard increases if material is allowed
to dry-Keep container tightly closed when not in use-In case of spill
or fire soak with water-For further information refer to MCA Chemical
Safety Data Sheet DS-96.
55
56
57
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In holding that a plaintiff is entitled to a strict liability jury
charge in this inadequate warning case,6 0 the court emphasized that
"there is a significant distinction between negligence and strict liability theory, at least in terms of imputing to the manufacturer
knowledge of the dangers inherent in the product."' 6 1 The court
thus concluded that
a products liability charge in an inadequate warning case must
focus on safety and emphasize that a manufacturer, in marketing a product with an inadequate warning as to its dangers,
has not satisfied its duty to warn, even if the product is perfectly inspected, designed, and manufactured. Moreover, and
importantly, the charge must make clear that knowledge of the
62
dangerous trait of the product is imputed to the manufacturer.
The facts of Freund did not require the court to address the element of time to determine when knowledge was imputed. Indeed, it
would appear that neither the Wade nor Keeton construct of presumed knowledge of the dangerous propensity of the product was
relevant to the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision since the manufacturer already placed a warning on the product, albeit inadequate. By its nature, the warning indicated that the manufacturer
was cognizant of a foreseeable harm in the use of its product.
The apparently settled issue of the time element for the imputation of knowledge in the strict liability design defect setting was altered by the court in the oft-critiqued case of Beshada v. JohnsManville Products Corp.6 ' The proliferation of asbestos litigation in
New Jersey and throughout the country from the mid-1970s on provided the historical backdrop to Beshada.64 Although it is not the
intention here to explore the procedural history of Beshada in a detailed sense, 65 it will suffice to say that the case went to the New

Jersey Supreme Court as a strict liability action, arising out of the
failure to warn of the hazards posed by asbestos exposure. 6 6 Asserting a state-of-the-art defense, the defendants contended that their
DANGER-FLAMMABLE

Id. at 235, 432 A.2d at 928.
60 Id. at 247-48, 432 A.2d at 934.
61 Id. at 240, 432 A.2d at 931.
62 Id. at 242-43, 432 A.2d at 932 (emphasis added).
63 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
64 See N.J. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS COMM. ON CIVIL

CASE MANAGEMENT &

PROCEDURES ON Toxic TORT LITIG., REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON ASBESTOS
LITIG. (Draft, Nov. 1983); Berry, Beshada v.Johns-Manville Prod. Corp.: Revolution-Or

Aberration-In Products Liability Law, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 786 (1984).
65 For such a discussion, see Berry, supra note 64, at 791-93.
66 See Beshada, 90 N.J. at 197, 447 A.2d at 542.
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failure, prior to the 1960s, to warn of the dangers reflected the medical community's lack of knowledge regarding the hazards of asbestos at that point.6 7 Citing Freund, the Beshada court declared that
knowledge of product danger, as it exists at the time of trial, would
be imputed to the defendant, thereby rendering the evidentiary
state of the art defense irrelevant.6 8
However, this reliance upon Freund was misplaced, since Freund
involved an analysis of inadequate warning situations as opposed to
failure to warn.6 9 In terms of the Wade and Keeton constructs, the
Beshada court clearly adopted Keeton's approach of imputing to the
manufacturer knowledge of the scientifically discoverable risks as
they existed at the time of trial. 70 This declaration constituted a
profound change in the New Jersey Supreme Court's philosophical
development regarding products liability. As a practical matter, in a
failure to warn case the imputation of knowledge of danger as of the
time of trial results in a presumption of knowledge that the product
was defective, as opposed to an imputation of knowledge of the reasonable foreseeability of harm. 7 '
The distinction is not one of mere semantics. Evidently, if the
presumption of knowledge of defect, as opposed to danger, is the
essence of the strict liability calculus, all the plaintiff need prove is
that the defendant's product was the proximate cause of injury. Instead of creating a rebuttable presumption that its product is dangerous," defect is conclusively established and only the issue of
id., 447 A.2d at 542-43.
68 Id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
69 In Freund, the plaintiff was injured as a result of his use of an extremely flammable chemical, and the issue was framed clearly in terms of whether the plaintiff
received sufficient warning of the chemical's danger. Freund v. Cellofim Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 233, 432 A.2d 925, 927 (1981).
70 Beshada, 90 N.J. at 205, 447 A.2d at 547. The concept of "scientific
knowability" appears problematic for the defendant in Beshada. Rather than imputing the defendant with the existing knowledge at the time of distribution, defendant is held to a standard of knowing that would be ascertained through an
unquantifiable amount of research and investigation. Id. at 206, 447 A.2d at 547.
71 See id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
72 The trial court in Beshada was mindful of the opinion in Barker v. Lull Eng'g
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). In Barker, the court
noted that knowledge concerning feasibility and alternative design rests squarely
with the defendants. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. Hence, the
court concluded "that once the plaintiff makes a primafacie showing that the injury
was proximately caused by the product's design, the burden should appropriately
shift to the defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that the product is
not defective." Id. The genesis of the Wade-Keeton approach that fixes a rebuttable presumption of knowledge of danger on the defendant is reflected in the Barker
opinion.
67
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proximate cause stands between the defendant and the imposition
of liability. The extension of the "legal fiction" of presumed knowledge in Beshada strayed far afield of NewJersey precedent, for previously, this notion had been nothing more than a theoretical
construct by which to articulate the differences between strict liability and negligence.
If the Beshada opinion represented the "legal fiction ' 7 3 of Dean
Keeton taken to an extreme, the subsequent decisions of the New
Jersey Supreme Court represent a well reasoned retraction.
Although the first case after Beshada was essentially a reaffirmation
of its principles,'7 the court in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.,75 later acknowledged the validity of the state-of-the-art defense in design defect cases when the risk-utility analysis was applied.7 6 Moreover,
unlike Beshada where the adoption of the Keeton approach in a failure to warn case translated into presumption of knowledge of defect
by the manufacturer, thereby relieving the plaintiff of that burden,7 7
the O'Brien court clarified the requirement that a plaintiff must prove
defect as a necessary element of the prima facie case.
Generally speaking, a plaintiff has the burden of proving that
(1) the product was defective; (2) the defect existed when the
product left the hands of the defendant; and (3) the defect
caused injury to a reasonably foreseeable user. Proof that the
product was defective requires more than a mere showing that
the product caused the injury. The necessity of proving a defect in the product as part of the plaintiff's primafacie case distinguishes strict from absolute liability, and thus prevents the
78
manufacturer from also becoming the insurer of a product.
Although O'Brien was a technological design case, the court's opinion appeared to forecast a departure from Keeton's "time of trial"
theory while positing that the presumption of knowledge of dangerousness was rebuttable. 7 9
Decided in 1984, Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories"0 revealed yet
another retreat from Keeton's theory. Like Beshada, Feldman inSee generally Wade, Knowledge UnavailablePrior to Marketing, supra note 2.
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982).
The Michalko case involved a defectively designed industrial machine, and the
court, in accord with the precepts of Beshada, imputed the defendant with knowledge of the defect. Id. at 395-96, 451 A.2d at 183-84.
73
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94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
Id. at 182, 463 A.2d at 305.

77
78

See Beshada, 80 N.J. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 179-80, 463 A.2d at 303 (citations omitted).
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See id. at 183-84, 463 A.2d at 305.
97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).

75

80
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volved strict liability in a failure to warn context, differing only in so
far as it concerned prescription drugs as opposed to asbestos."' In
its continued withdrawal from Keeton's "time of trial" approach,
the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that the defendants would
bear the burden of presenting proofs concerning "the status of
knowledge in the field at the time of distribution." 82
Soon after, the New Jersey Supreme Court was again called
upon to decide a strict liability inadequate warning case in Campos v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 3 The revitalization of rebuttable presumption of knowledge of dangerousness is clear in the court's depiction that in an inadequate warning case "[t]he adequacy of the
warning is to be evaluated in terms of what the manufacturer actually knew and what he 'should have.., known based on information
that was reasonably available or obtainable and [that] should have
alerted a reasonably prudent person to act.' "84 Significantly, the
Campos court imputed the manufacturer with knowledge of "the
dangerousness of the product, '"5 as opposed to the stringent "presumption of defect" phraseology of Beshada. This subtle distinction
comports with the requirement that a plaintiff prove the existence of
a defect to establish a prima facie case in strict liability.
Most recently the New Jersey Supreme Court had occasion to
consider the crux of a strict liability action in Waterson v. General Motors Corp." In Waterson, the court completely eliminated the presumption of knowledge language while articulating the strict liability
standard in the context of a products liability action.
The essence of an action in strict liability is that the injured
party is relieved of the burden of proving the manufacturer's
negligence. The injured party need prove, for the party's
prima facie case, only that the injury-causing product was un81 Id. at 450, 479 A.2d at 385. During infancy, the plaintiff was administered a
drug that was designed to prevent secondary infections arising from various childhood diseases. Id. at 436, 479 A.2d at 377. As a result of ingesting this drug, plain-

tiff's primary and secondary teeth became severely discolored. Id. at 437, 479 A.2d
at 378. During the period that the plaintiff was taking the drug, there was increased
evidence of a cause and effect relationship between the use of the drug and tooth
discoloration. Id. at 437-39, 479 A.2d at 378-79. The New Jersey Supreme Court

concluded that "a reasonably prudent manufacturer will be deemed to know of
reliable information generally available or reasonably obtainable in the industry or
in the particular field involved." Id. at 453, 479 A.2d at 387.
82 Id. at 456, 479 A.2d at 388 (emphasis added).
83 98 N.J. 198, 485 A.2d 305 (1984).
84 Id. at 206, 485 A.2d at 309 (quoting Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J.
429, 452, 479 A.2d 374, 386 (1984)).
85
86

Id. at 205, 485 A.2d at 309.
111 N.J. 238, 544 A.2d 357 (1988).
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safe or unfit for its intended or foreseeable use at the time it
left the manufacturer's control and that the injuries sustained
arose from the unsafe or unfit condition of the product.8 7
Perhaps Waterson represents the New Jersey Supreme Court's adoption of Dean Wade's ultimate suggestion that "there is no longer
any particular value in using the assumed-knowledge language."8 8
IV.

CONCLUSION

As section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts prepares
to celebrate its twenty-fifth anniversary, perhaps the presumed
knowledge theory of either Wade or Keeton would no longer
survive its risk-utility analysis. Indeed, as witnessed in Beshada,
the potential for undue and unintended consequences resulting
from its invocation outweighs its utility as a theoretical construct
to distinguish between strict liability and negligence. The New
Jersey Supreme Court cases since Beshada evidence a return to
presumption of knowledge of dangerousness as a rebuttable presumption, and the court's recent statement in Waterson appears to
embrace Dean Wade's suggestion that the construct be abandoned. Only future cases, however, will decide the fate and the
efficacy of this tortuous concept in strict products liability law in
New Jersey.
87 Id. at 267-68, 544 A.2d at 372. At issue in Waterson was "what effect, if any,

plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt has on her right to recover damages for the
personal injuries she received as a result of the accident caused by the defective
axle." Id. at 241, 544 A.2d at 358.
88 See Wade, Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, supra note 2, at 764.

